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THE INDIAN COOLIE LABOUR ISSUE 
IN QUEENSLAND 
[By L N. MOLES, B.A.] 
(Read at a meeting of the Society on 
February 28, 1957.) 
When Queensland was separated from New South 
Wal^s in 1859, there were two major problems of 
immediate concern to the new colony's progress. These 
were: first, a critical lack of efficient labour,^^* and 
second, the need to expand and rationalise an economy 
which was bound, almost exclusively, to the pastoral 
industry. An adequate solution to each had urgently 
to be found before the orderly development of the 
colony could proceed. 
It was early recognised that Queensland could not 
remain dependent upon one product, nor even upon 
solely pastoral products, and being a country whose 
territories lay entirely within the tropical or sub-
tropical belts, the cultivation of sugar and cotton 
offered immediate possibilities for swift agricultural 
development. 
In the circumstances, the Government had little 
hesitation in choosing cotton as the crop which would 
be the most lucrative. This was a time when civil war 
appeared imminent in the United States, .and England, 
likely to be deprived of her chief source of raw cotton, 
encouraged Queensland to expend her energies in the 
cultivation of this plant. Since early experiments had 
shown that both climate and soil were adaptable to 
successful cotton growing, the Queensland Government 
reacted to English promptings with alacrity, and in 
1860 premiums were offered in the form of land orders 
for the successful sale of cotton. At once, however, 
the difficulty of obtaining sufficient labour even for the 
task of clearing the coastal lands interposed a redoubt-
able obstacle between decision and effective action. 
In order to compete with American cotton it was 
realised that the Government would have to encourage 
the cultivation of far larger tracts of land than was 
possible at the hands of small farmers—even if it 
seemed hkely (which it did not) that sufficiently large 
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numbers of the latter could be brought to the colony. 
Thus, the plantation system at once suggested itself as 
being eminently suitable for cotton production in 
Queensland. 
However, such plantations (being too large) could 
not be worked, much less cleared, by their owners; 
neither could the work be done by European labourers 
because sufficient numbers of these were not avail-
able—while even had there been an adequate supply, 
the high rates of wages would have been prohibitive. 
This was a consideration which assumed vast impor-
tance when it was realised that cotton would have to be 
cultivated in Queensland at a considerably lower cost 
than in the United States in order to compensate for 
the heavier freights from Queensland—the more dis-
tant country from England. 
It seemed then that there was no possibility of 
successful competition with America unless the impor-
tation of some form of cheap labour was permitted—at 
the very least until the coastal areas were cleared and 
reduced to an easily workable condition. "Whilst 
anxious to encourage European immigration as largely 
as possible, we are convinced that for the development 
of the 'Central' and 'Northern' portions of the territory 
under Your Excellency's Government, the introduction 
of coolie labour is indispensable. With the command of 
that element, we believe that we could successfully 
compete with the sugar-growing colonies of Mauritius, 
Java and Manila, and ultimately with the U.S.A. in the 
growth of cotton." 2^) Accordingly, agitation commenced 
both in Quenesland and in England for the introduction 
of coolies from India. 
Apparently, English cotton merchants were grow-
ing daily more apprehensive of the possible effects of 
the American Civil War on the fl.ow of cotton to the 
English markets. In a letter from a Manchester mer-
chant to the President of the Glasgow Chamber of 
Commerce, the results obtained from the use of coolie 
labour in Mauritius were referred to, and a remark was 
added to the effect that ". . . the same thing might be 
done in Queensland. I wish you would induce someone 
in Queensland to establish a cotton farm with coolie 
labourers; if once begun it might lead to great results. 
The Governor of the colony might apply to the Cotton 
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Supply Association of Manchester for machinery to 
clean the cotton, and they would supply the best sort, 
and seed if required." <3) Similarly, in a despatch to the 
Colonial Secretary, Governor Bowen pointed out that a 
Mr. Bazley, cotton magnate of Manchester, was wilhng 
to give his assistance to any scheme for the cultivation 
of cotton in Queensland. The type of cotton which Mr. 
Bazley wished to popularise was one already tested on 
Queensland soil. This was "Sea Island" cotton which 
produced a thread so fine that it had already com-
manded attention when exhibited with a lump of Aus-
tralian gold at the Paris Exhibition. (^^ The thread was 
so delicate that Mr. Bazley had finally sent it to 
Calcutta to be woven, ". . . and in due time he had the 
happiness of receiving from India some of the finest 
Muslim ever manufactured, the produce of the skiH of 
the Hindoos with this dehcate Austrahan cotton." s^* 
Such a cotton, thought Governor Bowen, would be 
sufficiently rare, cheaply manufactured, and a great 
asset to Queensland's trade. He therefore supported 
with enthusiasm the proposed introduction of coohe 
labour. 
At the same time the Queensland Assembly 
received several petitions from various sections of the 
community, all advocating the use of coolie labour on 
the cotton fields of Queensland. They pointed out that 
the growth of sugar and cotton would be productive of 
great benefits to both Queensland and the mother 
country, and that coolie labour was indispensable. (<^^  
Not only were the coolies "a race habituated to work 
at field labour under a tropical sun," but the petitioners 
were further of the opinion that the introduction of an 
Asiatic race for the purpose of tropical agriculture 
would in no way interfere with the fair claims or 
prospects of the European immigrant—on the con-
trary, it might advance his position by giving increased 
value to property of every kind.^ ^> "The introduction 
of Asiatic labour would be to Queensland what 
machinery has been to England, elevating the European 
labourer to the rank of a mechanic, and the mechanic 
to that of an employer, and contributing in a marvel-
lous degree to the well-being of every class of 
society." ^^* 
The "Crown Lands' Ahenation Act, 1860," which 
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unlocked the coastal lands reserved by the New South 
Wales Government, removed the first obstacle in the 
way of tropical agriculture, but until the second 
obstacle (lack of labour) was also removed, the third 
(capital) would not be attracted. It remained then for 
the Queensland Government, by some means, to provide 
the labour necessary for the opening up of agricultural 
lands. 
Disregarding the appeals of a number of the 
residents of Brisbane and Ipswich who were opposed 
to the idea of coloured labour, ^^^ the fi.rst Parliament 
of Queensland appointed a Select Committee to investi- • 
gate the whole question of coolie immigration to 
Queensland. 1^0^  In issuing its report, the (Committee 
advised that the immigration of Europeans should be 
assisted by public funds, but that "no restriction should 
be thrown in the way of planters desirous of procuring 
Asiatic labour at their own cost and under the proper 
supervision of the Government. "^^  In recognising that 
both types of immigration could proceed simul-
taneously, the way was left o;:en for the introduction 
of coolies. 
However, merely to place no hindrance in the way 
of the introduction of coloured labourers was not to 
ensure an immediate place for them in the colony's 
economy. Coolies were the particular type at that time 
desired, ^^2) and according to Indian Government regula-
tions they could not be obtained by private individuals 
of another country unless the Government of that 
country first regulated their introduction. ^^3) This 
proviso, apart from being of particular concern to those 
who envisaged the unfettered immigration of Indian 
labour, might easily have given pause to the Queens-
land Governmnet's apparent willingness to formulate 
comprehensive regulations—for it was not to be for-
gotten that the initial arguments for coloured labour 
had rested substantially on the plea that coolies would 
be introduced privately and without constituting any 
drain on the public revenue. ^ *^' Nevertheless, the 
colonial Government responded to the concerted pres-
sure which was being brought to bear upon it, and 
during the second session of the first Parliament legis-
lation was passed which gave the force of law to any 
regulations which the Governor might issue for the 
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introduction and protection of labourers from British 
India. ^''^ 
In accordance with the terms of the act, regula-
tions were issued by the Govemor-in-Council on Feb-
ruary 11, 1863, legalising all contracts made with 
coolies after March 1;<^ >^ it seemed that the dual 
problem of finding a plentiful supply of labour and 
labour suited for work in tropical regions had been 
finally solved: the squatters would obtain shepherds 
while the coastal areas would be cleared and cotton and 
sugar made the staple products of Queensland. 
It would seem that the petitioners of Brisbane and 
Ipswich (1^ ' comprised the only strong element of 
opposition to the scheme inside the colony. When the 
passage of the Coolie Act appeared imminent, they 
appealed over the head of the Queensland Government 
to the Queen herself, praying that the Government of 
the colony be restrained from permitting the introduc-
tion of Indian coohes, and at the same time questioning 
the legality of framing regulations to the Governor-
in-Council. 1^^) They received no satisfaction. The Duke 
of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
replied that "no sufficient grounds are shown for 
depriving Queensland of a supply of Indian labour if 
the community at large desires to have it . . . and as 
the legislature represents the community, no constitu-
tional principle has been violated by leaving the details 
to the executive." ^^ '^ This ended the only significant 
move to prevent the introduction of coolies, though it 
foreshadowed the future opposition to Kanaka labour. 
As soon as the Indian Government had given its 
tentative approval to the regulations promulgated by 
the Governor of Queensland, ^^oi \^ seemed merely a 
question of time before coohes would begin to arrive 
in the colony. Yet, an eleventh-hour development 
prevented the scheme from being brought to fruition. 
Even with the permission which the Indian 
Government had given, in principle, to coolie immigra-
tion, certain details had still to be finahsed; above all, 
emigration agents had to be appointed in accordance 
with Indian regulations. At once an impasse was 
reached over the salary of the emigration agent to be 
appointed. Not only would the Indian Government 
refuse to allow the agent to receive payment propor-
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tionate to the number of emigrants sent, but it would 
require that a fixed salary be voted from Queensland 
Consohdated Revenue before such agent would be 
allowed to act at all. The Queensland Government w i^s 
not willing to make any such provision, ^^ D 
By this rejection of Indian terms (the more so in 
view of the pains which had been taken from the 
Queensland end to legahse coolie labour), the Queens-
land Government had manoeuvred itself into a cul-de-
sac which might have brought embarrassing political 
consequences. That this did not happen was due solely 
to the fact that public attention in the meantime had 
been attracted to an experiment with another, more 
easily obtainable, and even cheaper class of cheap 
coloured labour. 
These experiments which arrested the attention 
of the colonists was made by some South Coast planters 
and consisted in the trial of Kanakas as labourers for 
tropical agriculture. The sugar planters who had gone 
ahead and invested money in different parts of the 
colony in the belief that the Act of 1862 would forward 
their interests and provide the required labour, now 
turned in a body to obtain the Kanakas—the crucial 
factor in their decision being the fact that the services 
of the Kanakas could be bought at a much cheaper rate 
than the Indian coolies. *22» The coolie Act of 1862 was 
allowed to lapse and was effectively superseded by the 
passing of the "Polynesian Labourers' Act, 1868," 
Happily for the Queensland Government, the 
Kanaka had thus led it from a discomforting impasse. 
For the time being the question of Indian coolie labour 
in Queensland, if not entirely forgotten, was pushed* 
into the background. Not until 1874, it seems, was it 
revived again. 
On April 7 of that year John Murtagh Macrossan 
presented a petition from certain employers of labour, 
resident in the Kennedy district of North Queensland, 
representing the advantages of importing coloured 
labour to assist in rendering productive vast tracts of 
agricultural lands in the northern districts "which 
from the heat of the climate and other causes could 
not be successfully cultivated." ^ s^i The petitioners 
prayed that the Act of 1862 for obtaining coolies from 
British India, which had already been enacted by the 
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Government and had received Imperial sanction, should 
at once be put into active operation by the appointment 
of an Emigration Agent in accordance with the Indian 
Government regulations.^-*' 
In the same year, three northern members—Fitz-
gerald, Hodgkinson and Macrossan—put their signa-
tures to the so-called "Northern Manifesto," a docu-
ment setting out a five-point programme "to secure 
justice for the North," which, they maintained, was 
being exploited in the interests of the southern portion 
of the colony. Specifically, Point Five in the Manifesto 
called for the introduction of coolie labour for the sugar 
industry "as already provided for under the Act of 
1862 ." (25) 
In the first session of the 1874 sitting of Parlia-
ment, ^^ c) Fitzgerald, the member for Bowen, "who, as 
Thadeus O'Kane at any rate insisted, was the prime 
mover in the Manifesto," ^^7) introduced a motion 
requesting the Government to take action immediately 
on the matter of implementing the 1862 legislation 
relating to coolies: ". . . That to promote the growth of 
sugar and other tropical products along the north-east 
coast of Queensland especially within the tropics, by 
allowing cultivators of land to obtain, at their own 
expense, labourers from British India, the Act of 1862 
should be brought into force, and provision made by 
the Government on the Supplementary Estimates of 
1874 for the salary of an Emigration Agent under the 
Indian Government regulations; provided the amount 
of such salary and other 'expenses' be recouped to the 
Queensland (Government by pro rata contributions of 
persons taking advantage of the Acf'^^s) 
During the course of the ensuing debate, it became 
clear what the principal motives were underlying the 
reactivation of the coolie issue—particularly from the 
arguments put forward by Fitzgerald himself. It does 
not seem that the planters wished merely to supple-
ment the Kanaka labour supply, ^^p) rather that they 
were dissatisfi.ed with many aspects of the operation of 
that system. Fitzgerald first mentioned the language 
difficulty—that the Kanakas, brought from so many 
different islands, were therefore very difficult to 
manage. (30) Secondly, he drew the Assembly's atten-
1352 
tion to the difficulty of procuring the islanders without 
spending a great deal of time and money in going from 
island to island, and that consequently the planters 
"would rather have labourers from British India 
because they could be more certainly calculated upon, 
and would not entail so much trouble and annoyance 
as there was with the islanders." 3^^ ' 
In other words, the Kanaka system was not 
proving as cheap as the planters had originally thought. 
Above all, they were becoming increasingly disen-
chanted with the complications which proceeded from 
Queensland's having to recruit the labour, with all the 
attendant moral responsibilities. (^ 2) 
In order to give his polemic a more persuasive 
force, Fitzgerald repeated the conventional, disin-
terested argument in favour of coloured labour. (^ 3) He 
referred to the rich tracts of country along the north-
east coast which could not be worked by European 
labour because of the intense moist heat; he alluded to 
the huge amount of capital already invested in the 
sugar industry (little short of a million pounds ster-
ling) and declared that unless the planters obtained 
assistance of the kind they desired, enabling them to 
continue their operations, the industry would surely 
decay; he mentioned that the introduction of Indian 
coolies would not put white men out of jobs—on the 
contrary, they would provide further employment for 
whites as experience had shown in the case of the 
Kanakas; he charged that any agitation against 
coloured labour was carried on by only a few individuals 
mainly confined to Brisbane, whilst no prejudice or 
agitation could be found in the North where the 
coloured labour was actually being employed. Finally, 
he pointed out that employers of labour were free to 
import Chinese in any numbers, but that they did not 
wish to do so because of the great antipathy on the 
part of the digging population of the colony to the 
introduction of Chinese. They would therefore prefer 
having in the colony "those who were, after all, already 
their own fellow subjects." ^^'^^ 
The arguments advanced against Fitzgerald's 
motion, if not so seductive, or even so extensive, were 
nonetheless fundamental and reflected the doubts and 
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fears of a rapidly growing segment of public opinion. 
Such opposition focussed its attack on the whole ques-
tion of the acceptance in se of coloured labour and of 
the incalculable effects which it would certainly have on 
the hfe of the colony and the character of its institu-
tions: merely to argue the "economic" pros and cons 
of Kanaka or Indian labour on the entirely ad hoc 
assumption that coloured labour was necessary, was 
to avoid essential issues. The Colonial Secretary, 
Macalister, speaking against Fitzgerald's motion, 
devoted a great part of his speech to this point. He 
maintained that the establishment of a system of coolie 
immigration would at once have the effect of stopping 
European immigration to the colony. (^ '^ Furthermore, 
it was planned that Indians were to be introduced only 
as temporary labourers and not as permanent settlers; 
they would therefore be of no use ultimately in settling 
the colony—even if they were desirable as settlers, 
which they certainly were not. In a word, the Govern-
ment (of Macalister) and the community at large would 
continue to denounce any system of Indian coolie 
labour—especially if they were induced to remain in 
Queensland—since the encouragement of such immi-
gration would mean the introduction of a "servile and 
inferior race." (3^ ' 
To a large extent, Macalister's argument lost its 
force because he misinterpreted the feelings of the 
Assembly in regard to the whole question of coloured 
labour. Reduced to the most simple terms, his appeal 
rested on the conviction that coloured labour should 
be opposed on every conceivable ground. To Macahster, 
the social and economic effects of a coolie labour 
system—the two being quite inseparable—would be 
productive of nothing but harm to the colony's stan-
dard of hving, and the introduction of an "inferior" 
race would progressively impair Queensland's demo-
cratic institutions. 
However, in 1874, an argument of this kind, 
coloured as it was with considerations of race and the 
inviolability of a white society, possessed only 
embryonic potency; though pushed with conviction, it 
had not the political power of persuasion which similar 
arguments in later years acquired. On the contrary. 
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most people were still convinced that the principle of 
coloured labour in some form was incontestable on 
purely economic grounds. 
Thus, the inflammable issue at hand was, in 
reality, a difference to be found in the camp of the 
protagonists of coloured labour: between those who 
advocated coloured labour as cheap labour per se (that 
is to say, labour which need not necessarily be confined 
either to the tropical area of the colony or to the sugar 
industry), and those who condoned coloured labour as 
being essential for tropical agriculture (that is to say, 
labour which should be restricted to the tropics and to 
the sugar industry in such a way as not to compete 
with white labour on an open market or to endanger 
the living standards of the colony as a whole). 
Ironically enough, it was not Macalister, but a 
Northerner, Macrossan, who seized on these basic 
issues, divested all arguments of their superfluous 
rhetoric, and laid bare the sharp, though hitherto con-
cealed, dichotomy between the several vested interests 
concerned. In doing so, he split the North, pushed 
public opinion a little further into the anti-colour camp, 
and turned into positive channels the amorphous 
"liberal" sentiment which eventually put an end to the 
entire system of coloured labour. 
Speaking late in the debate, he admitted that, even 
when he had come to the House that night, it had been 
his intention to support Fitzgerald's motion. However, 
when two squatting members. Ivory and Morehead, had 
supported it simply as a source of cheap labour 
(obviously looking forward to its extension beyond the 
cane fields), he was forced to change his mind. Quite 
emphatically, Macrossan said that he would not coun-
tenance coloured competition with European labour; 
". . . if the honourable member for Bowen, in bringing 
forward his motion could so manage it as to confine 
this class of labour to the sugar industry and to that 
portion of the colony which, it was admitted, was 
unsuited for European labour, then he should vote for 
it, but on no other condition could he reconcile himself 
to do so."'^ ^^ Coohes he would have, but only so long as 
they were kept within bounds and certainly not at all 
once there was a chance of their operating beyond the 
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cane fields and so endangering standards of white 
labour in other industries. 
Obviously, while not even the northern members 
could agree, Fitzgerald's motion had no hope of success. 
It was defeated by eighteen votes to twelve, *'«' and the 
coolie question was thereby forced into abeyance until 
the Conservatives came into office in 1878. 
Largely as a result of his own personal influence(^^^ 
during the landslide election of 1878, Macrossan was 
able to secure a solid ministerial bloc of nine votes— 
the "Northern Nine" — in the Government which 
Mcllwraith subsequently formed. In view both of this 
resounding success and the fact that Macrossan had 
not abandoned his "coolies under safeguards" ideas in 
the intervening years, it was inevitable that some move 
would be made in the interests of the sugar industry. 
Such a move was taken in 1881 when Mcllwraith 
included in the Estimates a sum of money to cover the 
appointment of an Emigration Agent in British 
India;'40) j ^ doing so the flrst substantial indication was 
given that a definite move would be taken to implement 
the 1862 coolie Act. The Premier immediately con-
ducted long and painstaking negotiations with India 
for the formulation of comprehensive regulations under 
which coolie immigration to Queensland could be set in 
motion. (4^  > 
Fully aware of the electorate's sensitivity to the 
whole question of coloured labour ^'^2)—particularly with 
regard to the precise conditions under which it would 
be introduced—Mcllwraith took two carefully planned 
steps in the direction of creating a public state of mind 
which would ratify the action he proposed to take. The 
Regulations already framed under the 1862 Act were 
revised so as to ensure, first, that the coolies imported 
as labourers would not remain and settle in Queensland 
after their term of hiring was completed, and second, 
that their employment would be restricted to tropical 
agriculture. ^^3) 
Griffith, in opposition, was still not disposed to 
accept Mcllwraith's proposed course of action. Speak-
ing in support of a Bill which he immediately intro-
duced to repeal the 1862 Act, he put forward the usual 
arguments against coloured labour: that it would 
introduce a class of servile labour; that it would deter 
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European immigration to the colony; that it would be 
dangerous competition for white labour; that, being 
British subjects, Indian coolies would be entitled to 
full political rights after six months' residence in the 
colony. (**) In particular, he objected to the provision 
of the 1862 Act that any alteration in the Regulations 
was a matter for executive and not parliamentary 
approval. (*^^ 
In view of the provisos which he had already added 
to the Regulations, which were felt to be sufficient safe-
guard, Mcllwraith was willing to make only one further 
concession to Griffith's demands. He proposed an 
amendment to Griffith's Bill which provided for parlia-
mentary rather than executive approval before any 
action could be taken under the new regulations. In 
this, he was supported by Macrossan who took the view 
that coolies, as inhabitants of British India, could not 
legally be refused entry into the colony, and that, in 
consequence, Griffith's Bill was pointless. **^> 
In supporting Mcllwraith's amendment, Macros-
san, as always, was anxious about labour supplies for 
the sugar industry; he was honestly convinced (as were 
many of both parties at that time) that Europeans 
were unsuited for employment in the tropics, and was 
fully satisfied that Mcllwraith had done all in his power 
to prevent coloured labour from competing with Euro-
pean labour by circumscribing the former's employ-
ment. (*^^ In any case, he felt that it was better to lay 
down governmental regulations before the planters 
took the initiative and commenced immigration on their 
own account. ('^ ^^  
Griffith's Bill was negatived, and Mcllwraith based 
a short Bill on his amendment which subsequently 
passed into law as "The Indian Immigration Act 
Amendment Act." "The planters were jubilant." (*^^ 
Mcllwraith then, in a moment of judicious political 
insight, had secured the statutory prerequisite for the 
importation of Indian coolies. The planters were con-
tent, the squatters were forced to accept a fait 
accompli, and the opponents of coloured labour were 
powerless because. Mcllwraith's safeguards had satis-
fied a potentially antagonistic public opinion. 
Yet, his negotiations with the Indian Government 
did not proceed with a smoothness such as would have 
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guaranteed the immediate introduction of coolies into 
the colony. In the first place, conditions governing the 
emigration of coohes from India were not the same as 
they had been in 1862; successive enactments of the 
Indian Government (^^^  for the protection of coolie 
immigrants demanded compliance with new and strin-
gent conditions. In particular, the Queensland Govern-
ment was asked to send a representative to India for 
personal discussions on such questions as the appoint-
ment of a Protector of Immigrants (who would possess 
Indian experience and have some knowledge of Indian 
languages), the welfare of coolies in Queensland, the 
proportion of female to male immigrants, the payment 
of return passages, the hours and conditions of work, 
and the grounds for the cancellation of contracts. ^^^^  
So that the minutest details could be worked out, 
Mcllwraith despatched an agent to India to act on 
behalf of the Queensland Government. (^ 2) However, 
before his arrival in India, further correspondence 
between Mcllwraith and the Indian Government 
revealed that Mcllwraith's "safeguards," designed 
primarily to protect the Queenslander from the coolie, 
would not necessarily be acceptable to the Indian 
Government as sufficient safeguard for the coolie 
against exploitation by Queenslanders. (^^^  Specifically, 
the Indian Government "expressed regret" that the 
Queensland Government's object of restricting the 
employment of Indian immigrants to tropical agricul-
ture could create a state of affairs which would be most 
prejudicial to the best interests of the coolies; "the 
Governor-General-in-Council [was] unable to acquiesce 
in the proposal under which a British Indian subject 
[would] be exposed to the punishment of imprisonment 
for engaging himself in service other than that on 
account of which he was imported." (^"^^ 
In framing the regulation to which the Indian 
Government took exception, Mcllwraith explained that 
he had been influenced solely by the desire to confine 
coolies to tropical or semi-tropical agriculture by com-
pelling them to return to India upon the expiration of 
their contracts, or, alternatively, by insisting upon the 
renewal of their contracts in the same type of agricul-
ture—"thus preventing them from mixing with the 
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European population in the towns of the colony." (^ 5) 
He therefore assumed that the objection of the Indian 
Government was limited, not to their employment in 
tropical agriculture as such, but to the specific penalty 
proposed for coolies who transgressed the Queensland 
Government regulations. If this were the case, then he 
would be quite wilhng to recast the Regulations so that 
responsibility for evading the law would rest with the 
employer rather than with the coolie. In Mcllwraith's 
opinion, this could be effectively accomphshed by 
placing a contractual obligation on the coohe not to 
work in other than tropical agriculture, and by impos-
ing heavy penalties on those Queensland employers who 
sought to employ coolies in non-tropical industry. ^^6) 
On one other point the Indian Government showed 
that it was willing to make no concessions to 
expediency. This concerned the appointment and main-
tenance of a Protector of Immigrants to be stationed 
in Queensland. While Mcllwraith had already made 
provision in the public Estimates for the salary of an 
Emigration Agent in India, he seems to have been 
reluctant to hold himself responsible for the further 
charge on the public funds which the appointment of 
a Protector would have involved. (^^^  On the contrary, 
he saw no necessity for the appointment of such an 
officer by the Indian Government and solicited its views 
on a proposal to combine the position of Protector with 
that of Immigration Agent-Chief Inspector of Pacific 
Islanders. (^ )^ "He [the Chief Inspector of Pacific 
Islanders] had a well-organised staff, consisting of 
officers residing in several districts of the colony 
charged with the duty of carrying out the provisions of 
'The Pacific Islands Labourers' Act,' and these officers 
could be available for work usually undertaken by the 
Protector." (59) But the Indian Government was unbend-
ing. "With respect to the Protector of Immigrants the 
Government of India is unable to withdraw conditions 
under which the appointment of a Protector is required 
who shall be responsible for the general well-being of 
the coolies to the Government of India, and shall also 
be under its general control." (^o> 
Faced yet again with the threat of a breakdown in 
negotiations, and fearful of the political consequences 
should he adopt an intransigent position, Mcllwraith 
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readily acceded to the demands of the Indian Govern-
ment. ^^ |^) He had only now to introduce a second short 
Bill which would accommodate these requirements, and 
Indian coolie immigration could begin. However, before 
this could be done, there was a change in Govern-
ment (^ 2) and the new Premier, Griffith, "thanked the 
Government of India for its readiness to meet the 
wishes of the Colonial Government in the matter [of 
coolie immigration] but stated that it was not the 
intention of the present Government of Queensland to 
submit to Parliament for approval any regulations for 
the introduction of Indian immigrants." (^3» 
To prevent any future Government from trying to 
introduce coolie labour through a temporary majority 
in the Quensland Parhament, Griffith immediately 
introduced a Bill to repeal the two Indian Immigration 
Acts as soon as the Assembly reassembled in January 
1884. ^ 4^' As might have been expected the debate was 
inchned to digress from the point at issue, that is to 
say, the pros and cons of repeal, into a general argu-
ment on the advantages and disadvantages of coloured 
labour. Even those who opposed unrestricted coloured 
labour felt that Griffith's Bill was pointless and even 
dangerous, since, in the event of the Indian Govern-
ment's changing its legislation restricting the emigra-
tion of coolies, then private individuals might be in a 
position to import coohe labour. Naturally, should such 
a contingency arise, and should the Queensland Govern-
'ment have repealed its own legislation relating to 
coolie labour, then it would be quite impotent to control 
private use of such labour. (^ ^^  
The "Brisbane Courier" was disposed to support 
this stand which was taken by the Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr. Morehead. In successive editorials 
which appeared between January 11 and 17, the 
"Courier" deprecated the waste of time which discus-
sion of the coolie issue involved, (^^^  and considered that 
"the repeal of the existing law [would] be no safeguard 
against the future introduction of coolies or against 
the 'social revolution' that Griffith [dreaded].('^^^ In 
fact, that social revolution—which, if ever it was to be 
brought about, would be due to the introduction of 
Asiatics who would compete with whites in the general 
labour market, and not to the importation of mere field 
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hands—[could] not be obviated by the absence of a 
Coolie Act from our Statute Book." (^^^  
In spite of the fact that Griffith's Bill was defeated 
in the Legislative Council by two votes and did not 
become law, the sugar planters had ample reason to 
view with alarm the Premier's apparent determination 
to put an end to the coloured labour supply. (^^^  After 
1884 the sugar industry was threatened with the col-
lapse of the Kanaka system at a time when the sugar 
market was already depressed because of the over-
production of beet sugar in Europe; (^<^^ accordingly, in 
a desperate effort to preserve their interests, the 
planters showed their willingness to guarantee the pay-
ment of all expenses incurred by the Government in 
bringing coolies to the colony. (^^^  If the planters 
could induce the Indian Government to allow them, as 
individuals, to introduce coohes, would the Queensland 
Government place any obstacles in the way?(^2) 
Griffith's reply was quite explicit. Not only would 
he do everything in his power to prevent the introduc-
tion of Indian coolies under private enterprise, but he 
would regard Indian Government compliance with the 
planters' proposals as an unfriendly act. ("^^ Nor did the 
Premier stop here. "Seizing on the tide of public feel-
ing rising against the use of coloured labour because of 
certain New Guinea scandals, the Liberals, in 1886, 
carried out their resolution to remove [the Indian 
Coolie] Acts from the Statute Book."(7*> On this 
occasion the Opposition had no particular objection to 
the removal of the Acts (largely, it seems, because the 
labour position for the sugar planters had very much 
improved over that of the previous years),(^5) though 
many accused him of using this new repeal Bill as 
another opportunity of remaining popular with the 
electors. (^^^  
Any analysis of the coolie issue in Queensland 
would be incomplete without some attempt to explain 
Sir Samuel Griffith's motives in resisting the various 
proposals for the indenture of Indian coolies, for, 
obviously, the man's implacable opposition to Indian 
labour was the decisive factor which ensured their 
ultimate miscarriage. 
Many writers of Queensland history have found 
the character of Griffith elusive in view of the difficulty 
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which confronts them of reconcihng his actions with 
his stated behefs—and on no one question does he 
emerge as a figure of more dubious integrity than on 
the whole question of coloured labour. It seems, how-
ever, that the Indian coohe labour question can throw 
some light on this embarrassing dualism which was 
Griffith the man and Griffith the politician. 
Much of the confusion surrounding his person is 
due in no small part to the confiict between Griffith's 
vehement denunciations of coloured labour and the 
actual steps he took to give effect to his pronounce-
ments. And his views were certainly explicit. 
First, he doubted the vahdity of the assumption 
that the climate of North Queensland was unsuitable 
for white labour: "I beheve that the land can be culti-
vated by Europeans and that it will be so cultivated, 
but under different conditions, unless that result is 
defeated by the introduction of Asiatic labourers in 
large numbers . . ."(^ 7> 
Second, he was particularly concerned with the 
pohtical consequences of a well-established system of 
coloured labour: "It is not desirable regarding Queens-
land or the northern portion of it, as a country which 
is to be civilised and governed on the model adopted in 
the rest of the Australian colonies, that a servile race 
should be introduced who can never be admitted to a 
share of political power, and whose interests will need 
protection by a paternal government . . ."(^ ^^ 
Third, he feared the social and economic effects of 
Asiatic intrusion in a European society: "There . . . is 
no country in which Asiatic and European labourers 
are found working side by side on terms of equality. 
Where the Asiatic predominate or are admitted in con-
siderable numbers, it is invariably found that they, 
being able to save money out of a pittance . . . would 
by degrees monopolise all branches of industry." (^^^  
When such pronounced views as these were con-
trasted with the same man's "hesitant gropings" at 
the coloured (Kanaka) labour problem as a whole, it 
could have been foreseen that Griffith would receive 
accusations of "placating a vocal minority for the sake 
of cheap electoral credit." (^ °' Griffith's attitude to the 
Indian coohe issue might seem outwardly to substan-
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tiate the argument of his detractors. Coolie labour was 
never an actual problem, and even were it to become so, 
the existing Mcllwraith regulations must surely have 
ensured that it would never assume really dangerous 
dimensions. Thus, Griffith's persistent efforts to repeal 
the Indian Coolie Acts might be interpreted as no more 
than an innocuous sop proffered to the opponents of 
coloured labour in general, and a compromise of his 
own vigorous beliefs—that he was " 'humbugging' the 
public . . . that he was not really doing anything about 
the coloured labour problem . . .that he was hauling the 
dead coolie out of his grave simply to bury him for 
pohtical purposes." (^ 1' 
More than once he was criticised in this vein. "It 
is a mere trifling with the difficulty to talk about repeal-
ing the Indian Immigration Acts as a preventive 
against the colony being flooded with low class Asiatic 
labour . . . . Mr. Griffith and his followers are solemnly 
assuring the country that they will never allow the 
white labourers to be crowded out by coloured men, 
while the coloured men are landing literally in 
thousands. He told Mr. Black that it would be a poor 
way of preventing such an influx of Indian coolies, but 
he must surely know that the only reason why planters 
are importing miscellaneous labour is because they are 
not permitted to bring over Indians . . . " ^ 2^) 
However, such outright condemnation as this was 
totally unjustified; and while it is never possible to 
understand the enigma which is any man, it is possible 
to explain (and to a large extent vindicate) his actions 
by constructing a balanced view of the whole complex 
of motives which underlies them. It is the relationship 
of the North Queensland Separation Movement to the 
coloured labour issue which completes this complex in 
Griffith's case; and it is this which provides the key to 
an understanding of Griffith's actions just as coolie 
labour provided Griffith with the key to an under-
standing of the place which coloured labour held in 
the Separatist scheme of things. 
The argument is this: that until 1883-84, when 
the planters were content to seek coloured labour out-
side the Separation movement, and while the belief was 
still widespread that white labour was incapable of 
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effective work in tropical agriculture, Griffith was also 
content to limit his attacks on coloured labour to the 
relatively unimportant coolie issue. In doing this, he 
was compromising his own beliefs and acting so as not 
to offend any interests. When, however, it became 
obvious that the planters were behind the North 
Queensland Separation movement en bloc and were 
looking forward to coloured labour as a system of 
universal cheap labour (that is to say, labour not con-
fined to certain industries) in a new North Queensland 
colony, then Griffith realised that no further com-
promise could be made if North Queensland were to be 
saved for the colony—and, as already suggested, it was 
the coolie labour dispute in 1883-84 which revealed to 
Griffith this clandestine relationship. 
In the prior correspondence which had taken place 
between Griffith and the planters' representatives (^^^  
regarding the planters' attempt to introduce Indian 
coolies under private enterprise, the last letter 
pointedly alluded to the Separation movement in North 
Queensland which, at that time, was experiencing a 
sudden recrudescence. The Premier had previously 
expressed the opinion that to offer the planters any 
facilities for obtaining the labour they deemed neces-
sary by a system of regulated immigration from India, 
while it might create a temporary prosperity in certain 
districts of Queensland, would have an unfavourable 
effect upon Queensland as a country attractive to 
European immigration; (s*> he had therefore urged the 
planters to try "fairly" European labour. (^^^  
The planters' spokesman, Jeffray, made an unfor-
tunate reply. Discarding caution, and making no 
attempt to answer Griffith's refusal with a safe restate-
ment of the traditional reasons underlying the demand 
for coloured labour in the tropics, he replied simply 
that it was no use hiding any longer the real difference 
between cheap and dear labour. (^ 6) To this admission 
he added the implied threat that unless Griffith can-
didly accepted the facts of the case as they stood, 
then the Premier's continued refusal of the planters' 
demands might "have an important practical bearing 
upon the progress of a movement having for its object 
the redress of whatever grievances arise out of a 
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system based upon a supposed but unreal uniformity 
of industrial and political requirements." (^ >^ 
This seemed to show beyond question that the 
would-be employers of Indian labour would give their 
unequivocal support to the Separation movement in a 
final attempt to obtain the coloured labour they 
required. It served to confirm a suspicion which Griffith 
must have been nurturing for some months, deriving 
from a letter which two northern planters had 
addressed to the Colonial Off ice :" . . . . Coloured labour, 
which is absolutely necessary for tropical agriculture, 
is denied to the inhabitants of the North by the 
representatives of the South or temperate portions of 
the colony, and the development of one of the main 
sources of prosperity in the colony is thereby com-
pletely stopped. The inhabitants of North Queensland 
are anxious to obtain coolies from India under proper 
regulations and supervision, and so put an end entirely 
to the Polynesian labour traffic, which is a fertile source 
of omnes troubles and complications. This is refused 
by the South . . . . On the ground, therefore, (1) of 
the enormous territory and want of adequate super-
vision, (2) of the unjust deahng with loans and 
revenue, (3) of the great difference of policy as regards 
coloured labour, and (4) of the precedent afforded by 
the separtion of Queensland from New South Wales in 
1859, we sincerely trust that Her Majesty's Govern-
ment will see their way to dividing tropical from tem-
perate Queensland . . ."(^s) 
This rather obvious stressing of coloured labour 
as being the planters' main interest in the Separation 
movement had vital repercussions which not only 
altered the entire complexion of the coloured labour 
issue, but tipped the balance of non-partisan opinion to 
the side of the anti-Separationists in the controversy 
over the political future of North Queensland. It 
brought cohesion to the ranks of the opponents of 
coloured labour just as it sowed discord among the 
protagonists of Separation. The "unionists" could now 
charge that the people who wanted separation were the 
same who denounced the amended rules drawn up for 
the protection of Kanakas as "cast-iron regulations" 
which were "harassing and strangling the sugar 
industry." (89> They pointed out — and their appeals 
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were heard with increasing conviction—that such a 
northern colony could not be democratic since it would 
mean the rule of the employed by the employing class. 
Let all who enter the Northern colony—should it be 
formed—abandon hope of a European civihsation.^^"' 
The North Queensland Separation League at once 
felt called upon to repudiate the motives attributed to 
it. In a letter addressed to the Governor of Queensland 
in reply to Griffith's attacks, it was pointed out that 
the labour question had "never even in the most remote 
degree come into the programme of the Separation 
League initiated in 1882." (^^^  It was further denied 
that any connection existed between the League and 
the letter of Messrs. Davidson and Lawes. The League 
wished to remind the colonists that the question of the 
introduction of coloured labour had already been settled 
in the negative by the action of Parliament in 1885, in 
setting a time limit to the introduction of Kanaka 
labour and in repealing the Coohe Act of 1862.(^ 2) if 
Separation was granted and a representative Govern-
ment elected in North Queensland, then that Govern-
ment would have to leave the ultimate decision of 
pohtical questions in the hands of the electors who 
would have as much power to forbid coolie labour after 
Separation as before it. "Granting that the majority 
of the electors voted against coolie labour at the general 
election of 1883, it is to be presumed they would do the 
same when electing a Parliament of their own." (^2* 
Apart from this official objection to Griffith's 
charges that the movement was planter inspired and 
that it was using Separation as a facade to conceal the 
real motive of securing cheap coloured labour, another 
letter was received by the Governor signed by twenty 
sugar planters of the Mackay district expressing con-
cern with Griffith's now frequent insinuations that "the 
present movements for the territorial separation in 
Queensland originated with what he is pleased to call 
the 'planting party' . . . . The chief cause of the desire 
for separation, if honestly sought, may be found in the 
deep-rooted conviction that ever since the creation of 
the colony its Government has been rapidly deteriorat-
ing. . . . We may state with regard to coloured labour 
that we neither desire nor expect in the new colony any 
action to be taken which will not be for the welfare of 
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all classes of the community; but we do expect that any 
such action will be, after proper consideration, taken 
honestly and straight-forwardly in the interests of the 
whole of the State, and not for party purposes only; 
or worse still, for the fraudulent purposes of entrap-
ping capitalists into investments with the intention of 
eventually destroying their securities, as has been done 
by the Government of Queensland to those who have 
invested in its sugar industry." (^^^  
This last rebuttal was evidently repeated by 
English capitahsts who sympathised with the Separa-
tion movement because of the fertile ground for lucra-
tive investment which a colony of North Queensland 
might provide: ". . . . A few people in England who 
have invested their capital in Queensland on the 
strength of the invitations and acts of previous 
Queensland Governments, and who consider themselves 
aggrieved by the conduct of the present Government, 
cannot do more than express their sympathy with the 
people in North Queensland in their desire to be 
separated from the South . . . " (^^^  
However, these denials, presenting as they did in 
combination evidence (however circumstantial) of an 
apparent collusion between British capitalist, Queens-
land planter and Northern Separationist interests, 
defeated the purpose for which they were written. 
When placed beside the unthinking admission of 
Jeffray (^ '^ as to the real motives behind the planters' 
appeals for coloured labour, they merely rendered abor-
tive the plea of the Separation League that the aims of 
Separation and planter ambitions were both separate 
and mutually irreconcilable. Griffith was thus able to 
announce, "unhesitatingly, and with conviction," that 
"the demand for coloured labour is almost exclusively 
confined to persons interested directly or indirectly in 
the agricultural lands on the coast, while the town and 
mining populations and persons interested in pastoral 
pursuits (except some of the run-owners) are almost 
unanimously opposed to it."(^^) Governor Musgrave 
found himself substantially in agreement with Grif-
fith's conclusion. (^^^  
The simultaneous revival of the Separation and 
Indian coolie labour movements had thus helped to 
render intelligible what hitherto had been blurred. 
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First, it had shown the extent of planter interest in the 
Separation movement itself; second, it had exposed the 
planters' motives in supporting the movement; third, 
and most important, it had brought into perspective 
the essential issues involved in the entire coloured 
labour controversy. Whether white labour could or 
could not work in the tropics was now a matter of 
secondary importance: the planters had indicated that 
their desire was the institution of a system of universal 
cheap labour; therefore their own aims (and, conter-
minous with these, the aims of Separation) had to be 
thwarted in the interests of the preservation of a 
European society—a society which, above all, should be 
economicahy secure and socially homogeneous. 
The result was to inspire Griffith with a sense of 
passionate dedication (since, for the first time, he had 
a clear appreciation of what had to be accomplished) 
in his chosen mission of removing from the Statute 
Books for ah time the source of the colony's perpetual 
agony, that is, all acts relating to coloured labour. 
Coolie labour was merely one of the first steps to be 
taken, and because it was the first to appear as an 
urgent issue (through the fortuitous coincidence of 
circumstances just outhned) it was the fi.rst to be 
completed. 
The repeal of the Indian Immigration Acts in 1886 
represented the end of the twenty-year-old agitation to 
bring coolies to Queensland, though it is true, as one 
writer has suggested, (^^^  that memories and hopes died 
hard. The "Brisbane Courier," for example, "always 
had a sneaking fondness for coohes," (^ "^^  and found it 
hard to divest itself of sympathies that had been 
gradually evoked over a long period of time and then 
vigorously proselytised: "the colony cannot afford to 
allow the sugar industry to be crippled, and if there 
are any people so ignorant as to fancy that because 
they are not directly concerned in sugar an injury to 
the planters will not affect them, they may have a 
rude awakening from their comfortable sense of 
security." (101^  
Always, the importance of the Indian coolie ques-
tion in colonial society was circumscribed by the con-
troversy which ranged round that of Kanaka labour. 
The measure of this hmitation may perhaps be seen in 
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the indifferent, and, on the whole, non-partisan attitude 
of the British Government which was quite wilHng to 
refer back to the Queensland Government any matters 
relating to the coolie issue which were brought directly 
to its notice. (102) Similarly, in Queensland, there was 
much the same unwillingness, amounting almost to 
disdain, to treat "coolie labour" as an urgent social 
problem: it never became a reality, so it aroused 
neither violent zeal on the one hand nor extreme apathy 
on the other. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. 
Yet, for a generation, "cooUe labour" refused to 
leave the sidelines of Queensland pohtics. If it did not 
excite pubhc opinion, if it did not provoke wild 
emotions, if it did not cause Governments to totter in 
the way Kanaka labour was able to do, it was still apt 
to appear as an integral part of the entire problem of 
coloured labour—and it is precisely here that its impor-
tance lies. In the chaos of argument and counter-
argument which surrounded coloured labour, the Indian 
coolie question possessed a catalytic function, now 
clarifying, now revivifying, now reconstituting the 
essential issues which had to be resolved. 
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